In this paper we look at committee assignment focusing on the extent to which MPs' desires to become members of certain committees are fulfilled. Our theoretical argument is based on the assumption that legislators pursue individual goals, which interact with party leaders' ones. To test our hypotheses we use original survey data about elected candidates in the Italian Parliament collected immediately after the 2013 general election.
Introduction
The committee system is a crucial feature of modern legislatures. Classic approaches to legislative organization focus on committee structure to understand legislative proceedings and outcomes, generating different predictions about patterns of committee assignment. The distributive approach suggests that legislators pursuing re-election will seek to become members of those committees where they can serve the specific interests of their constituents (Shepsle 1979; Weingast and Marshall 1988) . Alternatively, according to the informational perspective, legislators will seek to become members of those committees where they can better exploit their policy expertise, acquired through their educational and occupational background (Krehbiel 1990 (Krehbiel , 1991 Krehbiel 1987, 1989) . Finally a party-centred approach suggests that party leaders will use committee assignments to increase party unity and thereby their control over the legislature (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Cox and McCubbins 1993) .
These competing views have been extensively debated with regard to the US Congress, and subsequently used to investigate committee structure and resources in different institutional settings (see Martin 2014 for a review). Overall, empirical research does not seem to bring clear-cut evidence in favour of either distributive, informative or partisan explanations, suggesting that all three approaches have some predictive power in explaining patterns of committee assignment in legislatures. Indeed, thinking about the compatibility of the different approaches, Shepsle and Weingast (1994: 175) claimed that, " [ … ] although the various authors of this literature have sought to differentiate their respective products, a compelling case for exclusivity has not been made and perhaps should not be".
In this paper we start from this assertion, and assume that committee assignment is the outcome of an interplay between individual legislators' aspirations and party control. It is widely recognized that parties play an irreplaceable role especially in parliamentary systems where they need to coordinate legislative behaviour in order to ensure survival and functioning of governments (Laver 2006) . As Damgaard (1995) pointed out several years ago, committee assignment is certainly one of the instruments through which party leaders control their party members.
We look at committee assignment focusing on the extent to which MPs' desires to become members of certain committees are fulfilled. Our argument is based on the assumption that legislators pursue individual goals, which interact with party leaders' ones.
Legislators may want to become members of a specific committee for several reasons such as those highlighted within the main approaches to the study of legislative behavior. On the other hand, in parliamentary systems, MPs are usually assigned to committees by party leaders. We expect that party leaders will assign party members to different committees in such a way to further parties' collective goals. This implies that legislators' individual aims will be achieved only in so far as they help to enhance party goals.
To test our hypotheses we use an original survey of elected candidates to the Italian Parliament. Our data, collected immediately after the 2013 general election, provide information about Italian MPs at the individual level: preferences about legislative committees' assignment, expertise, past political experience, educational and occupational background, ideological preferences and evaluations of relations within the party. Moreover, our data allow us to assess parties' positions and preferences.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section one summarizes our theoretical argument and introduces the hypotheses we derive from it. Section two briefly describes the committee system in the Italian parliament. Data and methods are illustrated in section three. We present our results in section four and discuss them in the concluding section.
Theory and hypotheses
Members of legislative assemblies have personal goals that they pursue when acting as representatives. As seminal studies of legislative behaviour have emphasized, legislators typically want to enhance their prospects of re-election, as well as to influence policy-making (Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974) . Legislators may pursue these goals by means of a variety of activities, such as introducing bills and amendments (Mattson 1995) , delivering speeches on the floor (Proksch and Slapin 2014; Giannetti and Pedrazzani 2016) , presenting parliamentary questions and interpellations (Russo 2011; Wiberg 1995) , and even switching strategically to more advantageous parliamentary party groups (Heller and Mershon 2005; Pinto 2015) .
Becoming a member of a certain committee and carrying out committee work are among these activities, especially in legislatures where committees are endowed with relevant prerogatives in the lawmaking process.
However, party leaders are commonly assumed to act in such a way to ensure party unity in committees and more generally in the legislative setting (Cox and McCubbins 1993) .
Party leaders are usually very interested in coordinating party members' behaviour in order to ensure party effectiveness throughout the legislative process. This is especially true in parliamentary democracies, where governments can enact their policy goals only in so far as they control cohesive legislative majorities (Laver 2006) . Party unity is valuable also for opposition parties when attempting to effectively challenge the incumbent government (Giannetti and Laver 2009 ).
1
Our general argument is that parliamentary parties' leaders will not let legislators selfselect to committees as both the distributive and informational approaches suggest. Party leaders will allow MPs to become members of the committee they desire if such assignments 1 Leaders' incentives for maintaining party unity do not depend just on electoral considerations. Governing parties' leaders cannot secure the support of a legislative majority and the enactment of the government's electoral program unless they control a disciplined bloc of legislators. In turn, opposition parties' leaders can hardly pose a credible threat to the stability of the government coalition if they do not rely on the loyalty of parliamentary parties' members.
will not undermine party effectiveness in the legislative process (Damgaard 1995) . When making assignment decisions, party leaders will reward "reliable" or "loyal" party members by allowing them to join the committee they desire (McElroy 2006) . In addition, choosing the "right" members of committees becomes more crucial in committees deemed as particularly important for the party. Following this theoretical argument, we derive hypotheses about how party leaders can be expected to deal with possible tensions between what individual MPs desires, based on the motivations highlighted above, and what party leaders think is desirable for pursuing their party's collective goals.
As implied by the distributive approach to legislative organization, legislators have personal goals that can be different from the policy programme of the party they belong to. This is because individual legislators often have various attachments to constituents, interest groups, private firms, professional associations, public institutions, and so on. In other words, the electoral constituency of representatives can be defined in geographical or functional terms. Legislators would then like to be assigned to the committee that has jurisdiction over the policies they (and their respective voters) care most about, as this will allow them to distribute benefits to their constituents and increase their re-election prospects (Shepsle 1979; Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen 1981; Weingast and Marshall 1988) . If individual legislators' desires were fulfilled, committees would consist of policy "outliers", or more specifically, "high demanders" for whatever benefits each committee provides. As a result, the legislation produced by the parliament would be biased toward particularistic interests, overproducing bills with a regional or narrowly sectional specific-benefits nature.
2 In light of Cox and McCubbins' (1993) The informational approach to legislative organization implies that those representatives who can specialize at lower costs -thanks to their professional training or other prior experience -in a committee are more likely to become members of that committee Krehbiel 1987, 1989; Krehbiel 1991) . For instance, a politician whose (previous) profession is working as a lawyer, magistrate or judge, will probably aim to join the justice committee; medical personnel are more likely to prefer the health committee, and so on. However, legislators with prior expertise in a given area are also very likely to generate huge information asymmetries between committee members and party leaders (as well as, more in general, between committee members and their colleagues who are not member of the same committee). On the one hand, committee members acting behind closed doors are supposed to act as agents of their party. On the other hand, if a legislator is a policy expert or a "natural specialist" (Mattson and Strøm 1995) in a certain committee, their principal can find it difficult to detect deviations from the party line. When working on legislation in a committee, a natural specialist is expected to pursue a technically feasible policy that is closest to their party's policy position. However, if thanks to their expertise members can move policy at their discretion when sitting in a committee then party leaders may be unable to understand if they are toeing the party line. The strategic advantage enjoyed by policy experts is enhanced when committee membership provides easy access to information through formal committee hearings, and facilitates developing relationships with outside interest groups and executive agencies in issue networks (Damgaard 1995) .
Such informational asymmetry would not be a serious problem for parties if the ideological preferences of natural specialists sitting in committees were aligned to the policy positions of their party. In this case, policy experts would indeed work for a technically feasible solution that is the closest to their party line. On the contrary, intra-party tensions can emerge if a natural specialist is an extreme member of her party because their work in a committee can undermine the party's effectiveness. As highlighted in the literature on delegation, information asymmetries are a major source of agency loss if combined with policy divergence between principals and agents (Strøm 2003) . In this view, an instrument at the party leaders' disposal is their authority to choose agents before the delegation takes place: that is their power to decide, among the possible candidates for a committee seat, who is going to become a member of that committee. We expect that party leaders will minimize adverse selection problems by fulfilling the desires of natural specialists only when they are not ideologically extreme members of the party. Therefore, our second hypothesis is the following:
H2: Legislators' individual desires to join a particular committee where they are policy experts are more likely to be fulfilled by party leaders the closer a legislator is in ideological terms to the party position.
The two hypotheses we have put forward rely on the idea that individual desires concerning committee assignment can often be at odds with party collective goals, which are safeguarded by party leaders. Following this line of reasoning, we would also expect party leaders to put greater effort to protect party goals the higher is the importance for the party of the policy area over which committees have jurisdiction. However, coordination problems within parties tend to increase for more salient committees simply because more legislators ask to become members of them. Needless to say, not all committees are equally valuable for a parliamentary party. When a committee is really important for a party many legislators from that party, regardless of ideological proximity to the party leadership, will ask to join that committee. This implies that a loyal party member is less likely to see her request fulfilled the more her preferred committee is salient for the party, as many other loyal members are making similar requests to their party leaders. The same holds for extreme members of the party: ceteris paribus, their requests to sit in their preferred committee are less likely to be fulfilled by party leaders because many other party members make similar claims.
In other words, MPs' requests can be incompatible in case of the most important committees, which usually attract interest from more candidates than those that can be accommodated given the limited number of committee seats available. Moreover, all committees in the legislature have to be filled, including those that are not very attractive for party members. This means, for example, that not all members of a rural party can sit in the agriculture committee, and some of them will have to sit, for instance, in the defence committee. When members of that rural party asks to join the agriculture committee for pursuing their personal goals, they can expect to have rather low chances to be assigned to that committee, even if they have preferences aligned with those of the party. The same legislators would have a much better chance if they asked to join a committee that is considered less important for their party, i.e. in this example the defence committee. To sum up, the more a committee is important for a party, the more committee assignment will be determined by party leadership concerns vis-à-vis individual legislators' preferences. On the basis of this pragmatic argument, we expect the following:
H3: Individual legislators' desires to join a particular committee -whether they are driven by distributive interests or by policy expertise -are less likely to be fulfilled by party leaders
the greater is the importance of that committee for the party.
The committee system's organization in Italy
Before illustrating how we empirically evaluate the three hypotheses put forward in the previous section, we briefly describe the organization of parliamentary committees and the assignment process in the Italian parliament. Legislative business is organized through a system of specialized standing committees, with prerogatives guaranteed both in the Italian Constitution and in the Rules of Procedures of the Chamber of Deputies. Italian committees are considered among the strongest in contemporary legislatures (Della Sala 1993; Lees and Shaw 1979; Martin 2011; Mattson and Strøm 1995; Strøm 1990; Zucchini 2001) . As in many parliamentary democracies, committees in both branches of the Italian parliament have jurisdictions that closely correspond to ministerial portfolios (Carroll and Cox 2012) , and have the authority to convene hearings and summon witnesses (Mattson and Strøm 1995) . In addition, Italian permanent committees retain extensive lawmaking powers: they can amend all types of legislation including government-sponsored bills, and according to the "decentralized procedure" which can be invoked in case of wide consensus in the assembly can even pass bills into law without sending them to the floor for examination. These institutional arrangements imply that becoming a member of a preferred committee can be crucial for enhancement of an MP's personal goals. share of legislative seats, and that no legislator can be member of more than one committee.
The assignment of Italian legislators to committees seems to be heavily influenced by parliamentary party leaders (Manzella 2003: 134-137; Traversa: 230-235 (Damgaard 1995) .
Research design, data and methods
To assess the explanatory value of legislative organization theories, empirical research on committee assignment in the US Congress has played a crucial role (Adler and Lapinski 1997; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Groseclose 1994; Krehbiel 1990 Krehbiel , 1991 Shepsle 1979) .
Outside the US, the appointment of committee members has been extensively investigated in the European Parliament ( Due to the dichotomous nature of our dependent variables, we use a logistic regression model to assess the relationship between group loyalty and committee importance for the party to which a legislator belongs with the likelihood to observe a positive match between self-selection into preferred committees and real assignments. To test our hypotheses, we performed two separate analyses. In both models, according to the latentvariable formulation of the logistic regression models, the dependent variable(s) (Match D* or Match I*) measures the propensity to observe a positive match for legislators included in our data set. 7 Based on the hypotheses put forward in the theoretical section, this propensity is then modelled as a function of two main independent variables: group loyalty, importance for the party of legislators' preferred committee, plus a series of control variables.
The ideological distance between MPs and the parties to which they belong is used as a proxy for group loyalty. More precisely, our first main independent variable is measured as 6 We cross-checked legislators' answers using information available on the website of the Chamber of Deputies (http://www.camera.it/leg17/28). 7 When logistic regression is formulated as a latent-variable model, the dependent variable is assumed to be a continuous latent variable which takes on values less than 0 when the event does not verify, and greater than 0 when it does, while the error term is distributed according to a standard logistic distribution. 
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, a party which greatly emphasizes environmental issues in its electoral manifesto (Pedrazzani and Pinto 2015) considered the environment, territory and public works committee as being very important.
[ Table 1 about here]
To single out the effects of our main covariates, we also take into account a number of control variables that are assumed to affect the process of committee assignment. should matter only in terms of committee incumbency, since it reveals a kind of "property rights" of certain MPs over their committee membership. As a consequence, we include two dichotomous control variables identifying incumbents with and without past experience in the committee they indicated when answering questions a) and b). Regarding MPs with past experience in their preferred committee, 12% of the legislators included in our survey data set are incumbents who indicated the same committee in which they sit in the past when answering question a). We found the same percentage of incumbents who indicated the same committee in which they sit in the past when answering question b) (12%). We identified about 14% of incumbent legislators who -when asked which committee best serves their distributive interests -indicated a different committee from the one they sit in the past (incumbents without past experience in their preferred committee). We found the same percentage of incumbents without past experience in their preferred committee (14%) for those legislators who indicated their preferred committee on the basis of their expertise and knowledge 9 . Third, we add a continuous variable measuring the age of the legislators included in our data set (the median age is 47 years). Finally, we took into account education and gender of legislators, incorporating in our model two dummies, identifying female MPs (27%) and MPs with a graduate or post-graduate education (71.6%).
Results
The logistic regression results are plotted in Figure 1 , which displays the log odds estimated by our models based on the distributive (M1) and expertise-based (M2) [ Figure 1 about here] Figure 2 shows the predicted probability (with 95% confidence intervals) of observing a positive match between individual committee preferences and real appointments when distributive motivations are taken into account in terms of different values of the group loyalty variable holding all other covariates in the model constant. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, a loyal legislator driven by distributive motivations has a higher probability to see her desires of joining a particular committee fulfilled by the party to which she belongs.
When legislators' ideal points almost coincide with the party leader' one (i.e. when the leftright distance between MPs and the party mean is near zero) the probability that individual preferences match with actual committee assignments is 62% [50%-75%]. As the ideological distance between MPs and the party mean increases, this probability drops. Moving one step on the right or on the left of the party line reduces the predicted probability to 48% [39%-57%]. When the distance is equal to the maximum value observed in our data (3.24), the likelihood of observing a positive match falls to 20% [.6%-39%]. In other words, when the value of loyalty moves from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean, the probability that MPs' self-selection into preferred committees coincides with real assignments decreases by 56%. Contrary to our expectations (Hypothesis 2), the same does not happen when expertise-based motivations are taken into account. According to our results there is no difference between loyal and disloyal legislators when policy expertise is driving committee self selection.
[ Figure 2 about here] Figure 3 plots the predicted probability of observing a match between MPs' preferred committees and real appointments against all the values of the committee importance variable, while holding the other covariates in the model constant. Consistent to Hypothesis 3, individual legislators' desires to enter a particular committee are less likely to be fulfilled as the committee's importance for the party increases. Preferred committee importance exerts a negative effect on both our dependent variables. However, it has a stronger impact on the propensity of a positive match between distributive motivations and current appointments, while it is barely significant on the propensity of a positive match between expertisemotivations and current appointments (at 90% level). As far as expertise-based motivations are concerned, the likelihood for a legislator to enter in a committee to which a party attaches a saliency score just above 6 is about 71% [57%-86%]. This figure is higher, i.e. 82% [65%-99%], when distributive interests are taken into account. When committee importance for the party approaches its maximum value (10), the probability to observe a positive match between self-selection and real assignment falls down by 51% when expertise drives the choice of the preferred committee and by 70% when distributive interests are prominent, reaching a predicted value of 35% [14%-56%] and 25% [0.7%-42%] respectively.
[ Figure 3 about here]
Among the control variables, both the covariates associated with committee membership, incumbency and age, exert a significant impact in both model specifications. As stated in the previous section, we include two dummies identifying incumbents with and without past experience in their preferred committee. However, incumbent legislators with past experience in their preferred committee are dropped from the analysis because of perfect prediction. 10 In other words, either they are driven by distributive interests or by policy expertise, incumbent MPs who indicate as their preferred committee the one in which they sat down in the past are always pleased by their party leaders. On the contrary, parties tend to "punish" those incumbent legislators who indicate a committee different from the one in which they served in the past: incumbents without past experience in their preferred committee (i.e. with experience in a different one) have a probability to see their desires fulfilled by their parties' leaders which is 65% lower for those MPs who are driven by distributive goals and 94% lower for those who are driven by their expertise respectively.
Together these results indicate that parties appreciate greater committee specialization, especially when information-based motivations drive legislators' choice. Regarding age, Figure 1 shows that older MPs have a higher chance to enter in their preferred committees.
Finally, the likelihood of observing a positive match between self-selection and real assignment is higher for legislators who are university graduates only when information driven motivations are taken into account (at 90% confidence level).
Conclusions
In this paper we examined patterns of committee assignment in the Italian Chamber of Deputies in light of the main approaches to legislative organization developed in the literature. We adopted a novel research design by using survey data about elected representatives in the 2013 Italian general elections. Our data allowed us to compare individual legislators' expressed preferences over committees with their actual assignment.
Our main findings highlight that individual preferences driven by distributive interests are more likely to be accommodated in case of loyal party members. On the contrary, party loyalty does not seem to affect committee assignment when MPs are driven by expertisebased motivations.
An increasing importance of party control when distributive interests are at stake is not surprising, as individual legislators' aims may conflict with party leaders' goals. 
